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Since the early 1970's, there has been much controversy over
the appropriate minimum drinking age' for young people. This arti-
cle discusses historical developments and background materials and
concludes that the minimum drinking age of twenty-one, which is
now the law in almost all states, is preferable to the eighteen- and
nineteen-year old drinking laws that obtained in the early 1970's.1
Simply, the risks of harm presented by alcohol use at ages eighteen,
nineteen, and twenty outweigh the benefits of lawful use at these
ages.
II. Historical Background3
A. The Colonial Period
There is conflict among scholarly sources about whether the co-
lonial period was characterized by heavy but controlled drinking or
by moderation." By no stretch of the imagination, however, was the
colonial period dry;8 on the other hand, it was not particularly char-
acterized by drunkenness.' Strong social standards laid down by the
* Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor of Law, the University of Texas at Austin. A.B.,
J.D., Columbia University.
The author would like to thank his colleague at the University of Texas Law School,
Professor Jay L. Westbrook (Texas B.A., 1965; J.D. 1968) for his review of the manuscript
and Brenda Sue Moseley (Texas B.A. 1979; J.D. 1987) for her research assistance.
1. The minimum legal drinking age is the age below which a person cannot purchase,
consume, or possess alcohol, and below which the sale of alcohol is forbidden.
2. Principles of fair disclosure require me to state that I am the father of an eighteen
year old daughter.
3. This section draws heavily on Mosher, The History of Youthful Drinking Laws: Im-
plications for Current Policy, in H. WECHSLER, MINIMUM DRINKING AGE LAWS, ch. 2 (1980)
[hereinafter Mosher], and on J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963) [hereinafter GUSFIELD]. In addition, some sub-
headings in this section are derived from the subheadings in the historical section of Mosher.
4. Compare Mosher, supra note 3, at 12, with GUSFIELD, supra note 3, at 37.
5. Mosher, supra note 3, at 12.
6. GUSFIELD, supra note 3, at 37; J.A. KROUT, THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 1-30
(1925) [hereinafter KROUTI.
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colonial aristocracy kept the public from drunkenness.7
No matter how one labels the drinking habits of Colonial
America, colonists considered alcohol as an "essential" 8 part of life.
It was used daily in homes, inns, and taverns.9 The tavern itself was
"a focal point of community life, a place for political decisions, rec-
reation, and entertainment, and the tavernkeeper was a respected
community leader." 10
Children, as well as adults, drank in Colonial America. Accord-
ing to one study, parents taught their children to drink when they
were young, sometimes even when they were babies.1 Adults also
encouraged adolescents to openly experiment with adult drinking be-
haviors. 12 For example, twelve-year old boys often entered taverns to
drink, and "fathers would even escort their sons, proud that their
offspring could participate in this manly activity." I s
In addition, students drank heavily at colleges, and colleges en-
couraged drinking by supplying alcohol to students. 4 One commen-
tator noted that the laws of this period reflected a "general accept-
ance or even encouragement of youthful drinking."' 5 Many
regulations of the liquor trade were passed during this period, but
very few of them dealt with drinking by the young. 6 Those that did
addressed special problems' 7 and did not deal with general prohibi-
tions on youthful drinking.
B. The Immediate Post-Revolutionary Period to Prohibition
The use of alcohol changed after the Revolutionary War and
during the nineteenth century. The pattern of the colonial period in-
cluded drinking daily, but not to drunkenness.' 8 As time went on,
however, this pattern became less common.' 9 It was replaced by reg-
7. GUSFIELD, supra note 3, at 37.
8. Levine, Colonial and Nineteenth Century American Thought About Liquor as a
Cause of Crime and Accidents, at 5-8 (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Society
for Social Problems, Sept. 1977) (as cited in Mosher, supra note 3, at 12). See also KROUT,
supra note 6, at I (" ... [u]se of alcoholic beverages was not only beneficial, but also
necessary.").
9. Mosher, supra note 3, at 12.
10. Id. See also GUSFIELD, supra note 3, at 37; KEOUT, supra note 6, at 44.
11. W. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 14 (1979)
[hereinafter RORABAUGH].





17. Mosher, supra note 3, at 12-13.
18. Id. at 14. See also GUSIELD, supra note 3, at 37; KROUT, supra note 6, at 1-25.
19. Mosher, supra note 3, at 14.
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ular heavy drinking bouts that included frequent drunkenness.2 0 In
the last years of the eighteenth century and the first two decades of
the nineteenth century, drunkenness became the norm.21 Heavy
drinkers who drank to drunkenness generally were members of the
lower and middle classes. 2 Before the Revolution, the strict stan-
dards of the colonial aristocracy controlled their drinking.23 After
the war, however, the power of the aristocracy weakened 24 and it
could no longer enforce the old norm.2 5 Nevertheless, the aristocracy
attacked the new drinking habits (including drunkenness) and began
the temperance movement in an attempt to maintain some of its
power, leadership, and prestige. " Although the aristocracy began
the temperance movement, this movement became important in
American life only as it became dominated by the lower and middle
classes. 7
There is not a great deal of evidence on the drinking patterns of
young people after the Revolutionary war, 2  but it appears that at
least some minors changed their drinking habits. "[The] post-Revo-
lutionary generation of students indulged in unprecedented lusty
drinking; ' 29 and there was very heavy drinking along the frontier
where men worked as trappers, miners, cowboys, and soldiers-all
trades begun at early ages.3
0
As young people began to drink heavily, pressure on them to
moderate or cease drinking arose. Colleges tried to restrict student
drinking,3 and legislation was enacted later that prohibited sellers of
alcohol from selling or giving it to minors.32 No state, however, made
it a crime for minors to drink.83 Society viewed the minors as inno-
cent victims, not persons at fault.
20. GUSFIELD, supra note 3, at 38-40; Mosher, supra note 3, at 14.
21. GUSFIELD, supra note 3, at 36-44.
22. Id. passim.
23. See supra note 6.
24. GUSFIELD, supra note 3, at 37-39. The weakening of the aristocracy was partly due
to changes wrought by the war itself. Id. at 38.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 5-6, 36-44.
27. Id. at 44. When temperance pressure came from the aristocracy, it came from
outside the group involved with drinking; when it came from the middle and lower classes, it
came from within the groups involved with drinking, i.e., it was indigenous.
28. Mosher, supra note 3, at 14.
29. RORABAUGH, supra note 11, at 139.
30. Mosher, supra note 3, at 14-15.
31. RORABAUGH, supra note 11, at 139.
32. Mosher, supra note 3, at 16.
33. Id. After prohibition, however, a substantial majority of the states made possession,
consumption, and purchase of alcohol offenses. In all probability, they did this for deterrent
and educational reasons.
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There was probably a special reason why states enacted legisla-
tion banning sales to minors. One commentator, relying on a study
by Marks,3 ' believes that stricter controls against children's drinking
"coincided with a major shift in societal attitudes toward
adolescence." 5
As Marks discusses . . . the state increasingly dictated the
fates of the family and young people after 1870. Child-labor
laws, compulsory-education laws, and juvenile courts, which had
the power to restrict or terminate parental rights if neglect or
abuse was established, became common throughout the country.
These had the effect of extending childhood to a later age and of
restricting the rights of children and parents to determine the
child's destiny ....
Thus, the change in youthful-drinking laws, which became pro-
nounced during the 1880's, can be viewed as one aspect of the state's
intervention into the parent-child relationship. Young adults' partici-
pation in the state's economy became restricted . . . and adolescence
became synonymous with "incompetency." . . . The state began
treating sixteen- to twenty-year olds with the same legal constraints
as those imposed on preadolescents. 6
C. Prohibition and Immediate Post-Prohibition
During state and national prohibition, bans on sales to minors
were, of course, unnecessary, but regulations again became necessary
after prohibition was repealed in 1933. The twenty-first amendment
left the control of alcohol to the states.3 " Almost all states that legal-
ized beverage alcohol prescribed a minimum drinking age of twenty-
one.38 New York, then the most populous state, was an exception; it
chose a minimum drinking age of eighteen.3 9
D. The Vietnam Period to the Present
There was no significant quarrel with the twenty-one-year mini-
mum drinking age until the early 1970's. At that time, a large num-
ber of states switched to minimum drinking ages below twenty-one"°
34. Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the Legal Conception of Grow-
ing Up and Letting Go, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 78, 85-88 (1975).
35. Mosher, supra note 3, at 16.
36. Id. at 16-17.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
38. Mosher, supra note 3, at 21-22.
39. Id. at 22.
40. Comment, The Politics and Consequences of the New Drinking Age Law, 13 FLA.
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and also lowered their ages of majority.4' While a number of factors
were involved, the primary cause for this switch was the Vietnam
War and the youth culture that developed largely as a result of the
war. Young men under the age of twenty-one were drafted and
killed in Vietnam, but they were legally minors and did not have the
rights and privileges of adults. They could not vote; they could not
drink; but they could serve and fall in battle.42
To the extent the Vietnam War was responsible for lowering the
age of majority in general and the minimum drinking age in particu-
lar in a large number of states, it should be realized that the changes
were for reasons somewhat different than the reasons an age of ma-
jority is usually lowered or raised. Normally, a change is based on
society's view of the age that should be considered the age of respon-
sible decision-making or competency. When states lowered the age
of majority and the minimum drinking age because boys were serv-
ing and dying in the War, however, they did so because society felt it
was unfair to have them serve and die and yet not have the rights
and privileges of adults. The states did not inquire whether the boys
were mature enough to vote or to handle liquor; they just deemed the
treatment to be unfair.
Another factor may have contributed to legislation reducing the
minimum drinking age. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, Ameri-
can attitudes toward adolescence became less paternalistic and
moved toward increased autonomy.4 This movement is illustrated in
the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the juvenile justice
system in the line of cases beginning with In re Gault in 1967. 44 In
these cases, the Court heavily criticized the paternalistic concept of
the juvenile courts and the way in which they dealt with youths.45
As a result of these factors, twenty-nine states lowered their
minimum legal drinking age, generally from twenty-one to eighteen,
during the early 1970's.' 6 Studies showed that lowering the mini-
ST. U. L. REv. 847, 847-48 (1985).
41. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 3, nn. 37, 38 (1978 and Supp. 1987).
42. Douglass, The Legal Drinking Age and Traffic Casualties: A Special Case of
Changing Alcohol Availability in a Public Health Context, H. WECHSLER, MINIMUM DRINK-
ING AGE LAWS 93, ch. 6 (1980).
In addition, the War in Vietnam was probably the major cause of the adoption of the
twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution in 1971. The twenty-sixth amendment gave eigh-
teen-year olds the right to vote in national elections.
43. Masher, supra note 3, at 28-29.
44. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
45. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (passim) (1967).
46. Comment, The Politics and Consequences of the New Drinking Age Law, 13 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 847 (1985).
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mum drinking age brought with it an increase in fatal accidents,"7
although the validity of the data is controversial. 48 Regretfully, how-
ever, the studies "leave some question as to the amount of the
increase.
4 9
An increasing number of states reacted to these statistics and
once again raised their minimum drinking ages (in the great major-
ity of cases to twenty-one) in the late 1970's and early 1980's.5*
More studies followed, and again there was controversy about the
validity of the data."' This time the great majority of the soundly-
designed studies found that raising the drinking age decreased fatal
accidents. 51 A major evaluative study recently prepared by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office concluded:
With regard only to driver fatal crash involvements statisti-
cally significant crash reductions were generally found for the
47. See, e.g., infra note 91-92.
48. Mosher, supra note 3, at 11.
49. Defining the Alcohol-Crash Problem, Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(U.S. Dep't of Transportation), Alcohol and Highway Safety 1984: A Review of the State of
the Knowledge 7, 31 (1985) [hereinafter Defining the Alcohol-Crash Problem].
50. DuMouchel, Williams & Zador, Raising the Alcohol Purchase Age: Its Effects on
Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes in Twenty-Six States, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 249-50 (1987);
Williams, Zador, Harris & Karpf, The Effect of Raising the Legal Minimum Drinking Age
on Involvement in Fatal Crashes, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (1983).
51. National Minimum Drinking Age Law, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions and Oversight of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
4-7 (testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky, Director, Program Evaluation and Methodology Divi-
sion, General Accounting Office) (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Hearing].
In 1984, Congress enacted legislation under which it withheld federal highway funds from
any state that did not raise its minimum drinking age to twenty-one by a certain date. See
infra notes 58-59. After the enactment of the legislation, the House Subcommittee on Investi-
gations and Oversight of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation asked the Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) to "critically examine the soundness of existing studies dealing
with minimum drinking age laws. ... 1986 Hearing, supra, at 1-2 (Remarks of Subcom-
mittee Chairman Oberstar). The GAO reported the results of its study at a hearing of the
subcommittee held on September 18, 1986.
The GAO identified eighty-two evaluative studies. Forty-nine of these examined the ef-
fects of an increase in the drinking age. These were screened for serious methodological
problems. Twenty-eight were discarded for methodological problems, leaving twenty-one for
evaluation. 1986 Hearing (Chelimsky Testimony), supra, at 5. According to the GAO, the
evaluation synthesis it completed for the Subcommittee was, to the best of its knowledge, "...
the first comprehensive effort to systematically array, analytically compare and bring together
in one place the findings of minimum age evaluations to see what they can tell us in their
aggregate." Id.
Material in the statements and testimony of other witnesses participating in the 1986
hearing (including a spokesman for a segment of the alcohol industry) suggests that all inter-
ested persons are not about to readily acquiesce in the conclusions of the General Accounting
Office. Id. at passim.
52. 1986 Hearing (Chelimsky Testimony), supra note 51, at 27. The bulk of the well-
designed studies on fatalities dealt with fatal accidents in which drivers were killed, rather
than with "total fatalities" in accidents. "Total fatalities" look at the deaths of drivers, passen-
gers, pedestrians, and drivers and passengers of other vehicles. The latter statistics appear to
be more important.
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affected group. All four of the soundly-designed national level
studies we reviewed reported reductions that ranged from five
percent to twenty-eight percent. Similar results were reported
for soundly-designed evaluations conducted at the state level.
Four of the five states that evaluated a law's impact on measures
of driver fatal crashes found statistically significant reductions
that were attributable to raising the drinking age."3
The General Accounting Office concluded that it could not "es-
timate the size of the traffic accident reduction that individual States
might expect to see after enacting a minimum drinking age law." 5'
It stated: "[w]hat we do know is that, in general, States can expect
reductions, but the magnitude of the reduction will depend on the
particular outcome measured and on the characteristics-geographic
or demographic or cultural--of the individual State."55
With public concern about drunken driving mounting,56 Presi-
dent Reagan created the Presidential Commission on Drunken Driv-
ing,57 which recommended that the states raise their minimum
drinking ages to twenty-one.58 One year after this recommendation
was made, however, only four of the twenty-three states that still
had minimum drinking ages below twenty-one had raised their mini-
mum ages. 9 It appeared that the Commission's recommendation
was not enough.60 Congress then "encouraged" states to raise their
minimum drinking ages by withholding money from states that did
not do so. In 1984, Congress amended the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982.61 Under the 1984 Act, the Secretary of
53. Id.
54. 1986 Hearing (Chelimsky Testimony), supra note 51, at 5.
55. Id. In addition, the bulk of the soundly-designed studies found that raising the
drinking age significantly decreased accidents involving driver fatalities and injuries. 1986
Hearing, (Chelimsky Testimony), supra note 51, at 26-27.
Further, when the Vietnam War ended, it was probably easier for states to raise the
minimum drinking age since there was no longer any colorably valid claim of unfairness. Men
were no longer being asked to serve and die; therefore, it was not unfair to say they could not
drink.
56. Comment, supra note 45.
57. Establishing Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, 47 Fed. Reg. 4,311 (Apr.
14, 1982).
58. Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, Final Report 10 (1983).
59. 1984 Cong. Rec. S8209 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (daily ed. June 26, 1984).
It is likely that a major reason for this is because the most important studies that linked
raising the minimum drinking age to decreased fatalities had not been undertaken or com-
pleted. Hence, they could not yet have impact.
60. Amici Curiae Brief of U.S. Senator Frank R. Lautenberg and Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD), at 6-7, South Dakota v. Dole, No. 86-260, Oct. Term 1986 (U.S.
Sup. St.) [hereinafter MADD brief].
61. Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, §§ 6-7, 98 Stat. 435, 437-39 (codified at
23 U.S.C. § 158).
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Transportation is required to withhold a percentage of a state's oth-
erwise allocable federal highway funds if the state does not establish
a minimum age of twenty-one for "the purchase or public posses-
sion" of alcoholic beverages.6" The Act was so successful that in De-
cember of 1986 President Reagan announced that, while when he
signed it "fewer than half the states had a 21 year old minimum
drinking age, . . . today all but seven do."63
South Dakota was one of the few states that chose not to com-
ply with the 1984 federal Act. The deviation was small (it permitted
persons 19 years of age or older to purchase 3.2 beer),64 but deviate
it did. South Dakota sued in federal court" seeking a declaratory
judgment that the 1984 federal Act violates both constitutional lim-
its on governmental exercise of the spending power and the twenty-
first amendment to the constitution. After losing in the lower
courts,6 South Dakota sought appeal to the Supreme Court. 7 The
Court granted certiorari and held that, even if Congress might not
have the power to directly impose a national minimum drinking age
(a question not decided by the Court), the federal act was a valid
exercise of Congress' spending power."
III. For a Twenty-One-Year Old Minimum Drinking Age
This section considers whether a twenty-one-year old minimum
drinking age is preferable to a lower minimum drinking age. It con-
cludes that the twenty-one-year old age is preferable."
62. Id. at 437. In 1986, the provisions pertaining to the minimum drinking age law were
amended. 23 U.S.C. § 158(a). However, these amendments do not affect the matters that
involve us.
It is surprising that the federal Act requires a sanction on "purchase" and "public posses-
sion" without requiring a sanction on sale or distribution. Every state bans sales to minors.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658(a) (West 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-86
(West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 904 (1985). Most states ban consumption,
purchase and/or possession by minors. See infra note 101. Before prohibition, states had
banned only sale and not consumption of alcohol by minors. See supra note 32. A better case
can be made for banning sale and distribution than for consumption. A ban on the sale and
distribution of alcohol is likely to provide the bulk of any deterrent effect on consumption by
underage persons.
63. National Drunk and Drugged Driving Awareness Week, Remarks on Signing Proc-
lamation 5591, 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1650 (Dec. 15, 1986). As of approximately Janu-
ary 1, 1988 only one state (Wyoming) had a minimum age of less than twenty-one.
64. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 35-6-27 (1986).
65. South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2795 (1987).
66. South Dakota v. Dole, 791 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1986).
67. South Dakota, 107 S. Ct. at 2795.
68. Id. at 2795-96.
69. Of course, the enactment of the 1984 federal Act and the decision in South Dakota
v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2795 (1987), mean the twenty-one-year old drinking age is law in all but
the most financially independent states. Whether it should be the law, however, is a different
MINIMUM DRINKING AGE
The reason for prohibiting conduct is to prevent the harm or
risk of harm associated with the conduct. Alcohol presents a number
of harms. Despite the fact that it is one of the most popular intoxi-
cants in the world (and the most preferred in the United States),
alcohol is in many ways quite a dangerous drug. It can cause or
contribute to a number of dangers to physical and mental health
such as cirrhosis of the liver,7" alcoholism,7' and precipitation of ag-
gressive behavior. 2 It is alcohol's relationship with the automobile,
however, that is given as the reason for a twenty-one-year old mini-
mum drinking age. The relationship has resulted in fatal crashes,
crashes causing bodily injury, and in crashes causing property
damage.a
The number of accidents involving drunken driving is quite
high. These accidents account for more than one-half of the 45,000
deaths in the United States caused by traffic accidents each year.74
The effect of mixing driving and alcohol is even stronger on the
young. Alcohol-related traffic deaths are the number one killer of
fifteen to twenty-four-year olds 7 5 and they account for approxi-
mately fifty percent of all teenage deaths.76 In addition, sixteen- to
twenty-four-year old drivers represent twenty percent of licensed
drivers in the United States and less than twenty percent of total
miles driven, yet they account for forty-two percent of all fatal alco-
hol-related accidents. Further, because of drunken driving, the life
expectancy of teenagers has remained constant for the last twenty
years even though the life expectancy of every other age group has
improved during this period. 8 Young drivers who drink are highly
dangerous to themselves, as well as to everyone else.
question.
70. Interview with Carlton K. Erickson, Professor, College of Pharmacy, University of
Texas at Austin (Aug. 31, 1987).
71. L. GOODMAN & A. GILMAN, THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS, ch.
23 (7th ed. 1985).
72. Id.
73. Defining the Alcohol-Crash Problem, supra note 49, at 13.
74. 1984 Cong. Rec. 5, 8207 (daily ed. June 26, 1984) (statement of Senator Danforth)
(cited in MADD brief, supra note 60, at 3).
75. National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, US DHHS Health,
United States, 1980, Pub. No. (PHS) BI-1232, December 1980 (as reported in Amicus Curiae
Brief of National Council on Alcoholism in South Dakota v. Dole, No. 86-260, Oct. term 1986
(U.S. Sup. Ct.), at 19, n.23 [hereinafter NCA brief].
76. 1984 Cong. Rec. § 3207 (statement of the Presiding Officer) (cited in MADD brief,
supra note 60, at 4) (daily ed. June 26, 1984).
77. NCA brief, supra note 76, at 19 (relying on U.S. Dep't of Transp., Fatal Accident
Reporting System, 1982, DOT Pub. No. (PHS) 806-556 (1984[h])).
78. 1985 Cong. Rec. 5, 9429 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (as reported in MADD
brief, supra note 60, at 4) (daily ed. July 11, 1985).
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One interesting study measured the fatal auto accidents involv-
ing alcohol for each 100,000,000 vehicle miles travelled.7 9 Teenage
drivers had the highest alcohol-involved fatal accident rate of any
age group-a rate of approximately 4.5 per 100,000,000 vehicle
miles80 compared to 3.38 for twenty-year olds,8' 4.08 for twenty-one-
year olds,"I 3.10 for twenty-two to twenty-four-year olds 83 and 1.50
for twenty-five- to forty-four-year olds. 8" The rates for persons in
their early twenties, while less than those for teenagers, are still
quite substantial and strongly implicate the involvement of drivers in
this group in fatal accidents involving alcohol. The study showed
that eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year olds had alcohol-involve-
ment fatal-accident rates very close to the rates of the sixteen- and
seventeen-year olds.85 Assuming the validity of these figures, it is
hard to justify treating eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year olds
differently than sixteen- and seventeen-year olds.
Surprisingly, the youngest drivers are less likely to drink before
or during driving than older drivers. 86 Despite this, it appears that
the "crash risk" of young drivers is higher after they drink than it is
for drivers from other age groups.87 A recent study stated that
"[t]he presumed reason for the higher alcohol crash risk faced by
younger drivers is their relative inexperience with driving after
drinking."88 It is believed that "alcohol has a greater effect on light
or inexperienced drinkers." 89 This study adds, however, that there is
little behavioral data on the differential effects of age to support this
view.90 The fact that teenagers (and young adults) are more likely to
be risk-takers and to believe they are immortal also contributes to
this crash risk.
It is reasonably clear that the twenty-one year old drinking age
saves lives,9 but it is not clear how many lives it saves.92 There have,
79. Defining the Alcohol-Crash Problem, supra note 49, at 30, Table 3-10.
80. Id. at 29, 30, Table 3-10. Sixteen- to seventeen-year olds had an alcohol-involved
fatal accident rate of 4.58 per 100,000 vehicle miles; eighteen-year olds rated 4.61 and






86. Id. at 30-31.
87. Id. at 31.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 39.
90. Id. at 31.
91. See supra notes 50 & 51 and infra notes 90-92.
92. Defining the Alcohol-Crash Problem, supra note 49, at 31.
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however, been various estimates and studies on the topic. One study
undertaken by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
investigated fatal crashes in thirteen states. Raising the minimum
drinking age had a positive effect in ten of the thirteen states. The
investigators estimated that fatal crashes involving alcohol-impaired
drivers were reduced by thirteen percent. They also estimated that
raising the minimum drinking age to twenty-one nationally would
save approximately 550 lives each year.9"
A study conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety measured the effects of raising the minimum drinking age in
the twenty-six states that had done so between 1975 and 1984. The
researchers estimated that, as a result of the increasing drinking age,
"nighttime driver fatal crash involvements" decreased by thirteen
percent.94
Another study examined nine states that raised the minimum
drinking age between September 1, 1976, and January 1, 1980. It
estimated that "each year there could be about 730 fewer young
drivers involved in nighttime fatal crashes if in all states the drinking
age for all alcoholic beverages was raised to twenty-one.95 It also
estimated that any state which raises its minimum drinking age "can
expect the nighttime fatal crashes of drivers of the affected age
groups to drop by about twenty-eight percent."96
Even making allowances for defects and questions of certainty
in the data, the minimum drinking age should be set at twenty-one.
There is very little question that the twenty-one-year old minimum
drinking age saves lives,97 and even the lowest reliable estimate of
93. R. ARNOLD, EFFECT OF RAISING THE LEGAL DRINKING AGE ON DRIVER INVOLVE-
MENT IN FATAL CRASHES: THE EXPERIENCE OF THIRTEEN STATES (Nat'l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., Nat'l Center for Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Transportation (as
reported in Amicus Curiae Brief of Insurance Institute for Highway Safety in South Dakota v.
Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2795 (1987), at 5 n.8) (1985)) [hereinafter Insurance Institute brief]. This
was one of the studies that the General Accounting Office considered properly designed in its
evaluative study. 1986 Hearing (Chelimsky Statement), supra note 51, at 10.
94. DuMouchel, Williams & Zador, Raising the Alcohol Purchase Age: Its Effect on
Fatal Motor Crashes in 26 States, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, at 251-54 (1987). The GAO also
deemed this study to be properly designed. 1986 Hearing (Chelimsky Testimony), supra note
51, at 10.
95. Williams, Zador, Harris & Karpf, The Effect of Raising the Legal Minimum
Drinking Age on Involvement in Fatal Crashes, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 179 (1983). The
GAO also found this study properly designed. 1986 Hearing (Chelimsky Testimony), supra
note 51, at 1I.
96. Id.
97. In addition to saving the lives of eighteen- to twenty-year olds, it is possible that the
twenty-one-year old minimum drinking age may deter more high school and junior high school
students from using alcohol than the eighteen-year old minimum. This is known as the "spil-
lover effect." Bonnie, Discouraging Unhealthy Personal Choices Through Government Regu-
lation: Some Thoughts About the Minimum Drinking Age, H. WECHSLER, MINIMUM DRINK-
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lives saved is a substantial number. In addition, a higher minimum
drinking age reduces personal injuries, some of which may be very
serious.98
To the extent the author has any doubt about whether the
drinking age should be set at twenty-one, he personally resolves it by
pointing to the special value he attaches to the lives, bodies, and
spirit of the young (a value others undoubtedly share). 99 When the
concern is something as important as death or injury by drunken-
driving, 100 society should not afford autonomy10' to eighteen- to
twenty-year olds, but should rather be more paternalistic.0 2 The al-
cohol-crash-record of persons in this age group is relatively high
compared to other age groups. Its members have not shown that they
can be treated like adults in alcohol-related decisions and they have
not shown themselves to be responsible. This viewpoint is not a de-
cree of paternalism for life, however. Whether warranted or not,
eighteen- to twenty-year olds will be allowed to drink at age twenty-
one. 103 Their autonomy is being deferred, not denied.
ING AGE LAWS, ch. 3 at 39, 47 (1980) [hereinafter Bonnie]. On the other hand, the GAO
study, "found little evidence to suggest that an increase in the legal drinking age has an effect
on the involvement of sixteen- and seventeen-year old drivers in alcohol-related accidents."
1986 Hearing (Chelimsky Testimony), supra note 51, at 33. It added, however, that
"[claution in interpreting these results ...is warranted." Id.
98. There are many personal injury accidents resulting from the use of alcohol. One
source estimates that in 1980, 520,000 or 18% of all personal injury accidents involved alcohol.
Defining the Alcohol-Crash Problem, supra note 49, at 38. The incidence of alcohol is higher
in more serious accidents involving fatality or serious injury than in accidents that involve only
minor injury or property damage. Id. at 12.
99. Opinions differ as to whether the number of lives saved nationally by the twenty-
one-year old minimum drinking age is large enough to warrant it. Here too the author resolves
the question by pointing to the value of the young.
100. Moreover, the risks of death and injury presented by drunken driving are not
merely risks of harm to self; they are risks of harm to others. There may well be a greater
interest in preventing innocent parties from suffering death or injury than in protecting the
principal actor from killing or injuring himself.
101. For example, autonomy to use alcohol for recreation or intoxication.
102. One secondary reason for lowering the minimum drinking age in the early 1970s
resulted from society's less paternalistic view of adolescents. See supra notes 42-44 and accom-
panying text. The general move to raise the minimum drinking age shows a return to paternal-
ism under certain circumstances. It shows a return to paternalism when considerations of un-
fairness no longer apply and when life and limb are at stake. Id. Considerations of paternalism
might not be given as much weight when different or no countervailing considerations are
involved.
103. Ages of majority, competency or capacity are almost always arbitrary, although a
state may make a rule providing that a person who is individually determined to be mature for
a particular purpose might do something an immature person might not.
Because the involvement in fatal accidents of persons aged twenty-one to twenty-four is
quite high, a case can be made for deferring lawful drinking until twenty-five. This suggestion,
however, is not practical.
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A. Costs of the Twenty-One-Year Old Minimum Drinking Age
Despite all this, it would still be appropriate to espouse a mini-
mum drinking age lower than twenty-one if the social and financial
costs of the twenty-one-year old age exceeded the benefits gained
from it. It does not, however, appear that the costs of the twenty-
one-year old drinking age are especially great. The historical evi-
dence does not suggest any profound enforcement problems or seri-
ous abuse in enforcement. To the extent the minimum age law is
directed against sales or distributions to eighteen- to twenty-year
olds, the law does not result in inordinate costs. While owners of
clubs and bars in college towns and neighborhoods may have to close
because business suffers, the potential saving to life and limb cer-
tainly outweighs these costs. To the extent that compliance with the
regulatory system by legitimate sellers adds to the cost of doing busi-
ness, regulatory laws commonly have this effect.
To the extent some are worried about treating the young con-
sumer as a criminal, a state sanction on the consumer need not be a
full criminal offense that carries with it the possibility of a jail term,
a criminal record, and other indicia of criminality. A number of
states treat possession of small quantities of marijuana, whether by
adults or minors, as an "infraction" or a "violation," with conse-
quences much like a traffic offense.1"' While this approach has not
been used significantly to deal with possession of alcohol by mi-
nors, 10 5 it is a viable alternative to current sanctions.
B. Sanctions
The minimum drinking age may be enforced by a sanction on
sale and distribution or on such consumption offenses as posses-
sion. 106 Full criminal sanctions against possession, such as misde-
meanor treatment with the possibility of a jail term, are not needed,
however. It is questionable whether eighteen- to twenty-year olds are
104. Bonnie, supra note 97, at 48-54. See also Rosenthal, Partial Prohibition of Non-
Medical Use of Mind-Altering Drugs. Proposals for Change, 16 HOUSTON L. REV. 603, 610-
11, 626 (1979).
105. Possession of alcohol by minors is not an offense in a relatively small number of
states. For example, in Maine, Massachusetts and New York it is not a punishable offense. In
the majority of states, however, it is either a jailable or fineable misdemeanor or other minor
criminal offense. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-1-5 (1986) (fine and/or jail); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 281-101.5(b), (d) (1985) (fine and/or jail); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.270,
66.44.290, 66.44.291 (West 1985) (fine and/or jail); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658(b)
(West 1985) (fine and/or community service); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-89 (West Supp.
1987) (fine); MICH. STAT, ANN. § 18.1004(2) (1987) (first offense - fine; second and third
offenses - fine or participation in substance abuse prevention program).
106. See supra note 62.
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1988
deterred from purchasing or using alcohol by a possession law. At
these ages, alcohol is a real part of so many of their lives, and they
are subject to peer pressure. In addition, the implicit statement made
by a law that will allow them to drink in a year or two, but not when
they are eighteen to twenty, constitutes a mixed message.
It seems clear that the law against sale and distribution to mi-
nors provides most of the deterrence from the minimum drinking
age. While some sellers violate the law, most recognize that they
work in a regulated industry and that violating the law will interfere
with their livelihoods. With so much of the deterrent effect of the
minimum drinking age coming from the law against distribution and
so little from the law against consumption, full criminalization of
consumption offenses appears to be overkill.
Since sanctions on possession are not likely to have a substantial
deterrent or educational effect, one could reasonably take the view
that no sanctions should be imposed. Society is concerned with mat-
ters as serious as the risk of death and personal injury, however, and
some kind of sanction on possession should be maintained. Thus, a
middle of the road position, such as treating possession as an infrac-
tion with consequences much like a traffic violation, is desirable. This
sanction would be available for deterrent, educational, and symbolic
effects."0 7 At the same time, this treatment will spare the accused
from a criminal record and other indicia of criminality.
IV. Conclusion
After the repeal of national prohibition, all states prohibited mi-
nors from consuming alcohol. Nearly all states barred persons under
twenty-one from consumption. In the early 1970's, a large number of
states, responding to the view that it was unfair to let young men
serve and die in Vietnam and not let them drink, lowered their mini-
mum drinking ages to eighteen or nineteen. Unfortunately, this re-
sulted in increased fatalities in the eighteen- to twenty-year age
group. To deal with this problem, the states (with federal prodding)
again raised their minimum drinking ages to twenty-one. As a result,
highway fatalities and injuries involving eighteen- to twenty-year
olds have decreased.
The twenty-one-year old minimum drinking age is better than
lower minimum drinking ages because it saves the lives, bodies, and
107. Infraction treatment might also be used to force a person to attend an educational
program. Further, infraction treatment could be accompanied by increased auto insurance
rates for violators.
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spirit of young people. The performance of younger persons with al-
cohol and driving is very poor and does not warrant giving them au-
tonomy to drink before their twenty-first birthdays. Even then, soci-
ety can only hope that they will behave responsibly.

